A Rejoinder to G. Skinner\u27s \u3cem\u3eRethinking Limited Liability of Parent Corporations for Foreign Subsidiaries\u27 Violations of International Human Rights Law by Mares, Radu
Washington and Lee Law Review Online 
Volume 73 Issue 1 Article 2 
6-7-2016 
A Rejoinder to G. Skinner's Rethinking Limited Liability of Parent 
Corporations for Foreign Subsidiaries' Violations of International 
Human Rights Law 
Radu Mares 
Raoul Wallenberg Institute of Human Rights and Humanitarian Law 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.law.wlu.edu/wlulr-online 
 Part of the Business Organizations Law Commons, and the Human Rights Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Radu Mares, A Rejoinder to G. Skinner's Rethinking Limited Liability of Parent Corporations for Foreign 
Subsidiaries' Violations of International Human Rights Law, 73 WASH. & LEE L. REV. ONLINE 117 (2016), 
https://scholarlycommons.law.wlu.edu/wlulr-online/vol73/iss1/2 
This Response is brought to you for free and open access by the Law School Journals at Washington & Lee 
University School of Law Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Washington and Lee Law 
Review Online by an authorized editor of Washington & Lee University School of Law Scholarly Commons. For more 
information, please contact christensena@wlu.edu. 
 
117 
A Rejoinder to G. Skinner’s Rethinking 
Limited Liability of Parent 
Corporations for Foreign Subsidiaries’ 
Violations of International Human 
Rights Law 
Radu Mares* 
Table of Contents 
 I. Skinner’s Arguments and Their Merits ..........................117 
 II. The First Baseline: The Legalistic Approach  
  Behind the UN Draft Norms ...........................................122 
 III. The Second Baseline: The Polycentric Approach  
  Behind the UN Guiding Principles .................................128 
 IV. The Third Baseline: The Two-Track,  
  Multi-Channel Legalization Perspective .........................136 
  A. The Context of the Third Legalization Baseline .......136 
  B. A BHR Legalization Perspective to Match the  
   Context .......................................................................147 
  C. Towards Genuine Complementarity with the  
   UNGPs .......................................................................152 
 V. Conclusion ........................................................................156 
 
I. Skinner’s Arguments and Their Merits 
Professor Gwynne Skinner puts forward a stringent, legally 
binding regime of corporate accountability characterized by a 
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high-risk perspective on regulating multinational enterprises 
(MNEs) and a rightholder-centered perspective on remedies.1 The 
proposal covers only parent-subsidiary relationships and thus 
does not extend to buyer-supplier relationships.2 The proposal is 
also confined to customary law—a narrow band of human 
rights—which serves to reduce tensions with sovereign states 
that might not have ratified all human rights treaties. Skinner 
pushes the envelope on the standard of liability that questions 
the legal separation of entities—a bedrock principle of business 
law by advocating an exception based on public policy grounds; 
she justifies such an exception both conceptually and based on 
precedents carving such exceptions.3 
These are all careful choices and delimitations that align well 
with the great currents in “business and human rights” (BHR) 
nowadays. Regarding the high-risk perspective, Skinner proposes 
that MNEs should be held liable when they operate in countries 
known to pose a high risk of human rights abuses. This argument 
aligns with several National Action Plans on BHR (NAPs),4 the 
focus of corporate social responsibility (CSR) programs pursued 
by the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 
(OECD),5 or the UN Guiding Principles (UNGPs).6  
                                                                                                     
 1. See generally Gwynne Skinner, Rethinking Limited Liability of Parent 
Corporations for Foreign Subsidiaries’ Violations of International Human Rights 
Law, 72 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1769 (2015) (arguing for stricter liability for 
multinational companies). 
 2. As a difference from Skinner and for simplicity, I refer to parent 
companies and MNEs interchangeably to discuss the human rights 
responsibilities of such business enterprises regarding the operations of their 
business partners, primarily in developing countries. 
 3. See id. at 1786–878 (presenting Skinner’s main arguments). 
 4. See, e.g., MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS, NATIONAL ACTION PLAN ON 
BUSINESS AND HUMAN RIGHTS (2013) (outlining a plan to encourage businesses to 
respect human rights); GOVERNMENT OFFICES OF SWEDEN, ACTION PLAN FOR 
BUSINESS AND HUMAN RIGHTS (2015) (same). 
 5. For more information on OECD’s work on responsible business conduct 
in the Mineral, Agricultural, and Textiles supply chains, see The Guidelines in 
Action, OECD,  https://mneguidelines.oecd.org/implementation (last visited Mar. 
8, 2016) (reflecting the characteristics of different supply chains) (on file with 
the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 6. See John Ruggie (Special Representative of the Secretary-General), 
Rep. on the Issue of Human Rights and Transnational Corporations and Other 
Business Enterprises, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/17/31, annex ¶ 24 (Mar. 21, 2011) 
[hereinafter Guiding Principles] (“Where it is necessary to prioritize actions to 
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Regarding the rightholder-centered perspective, Skinner’s 
treatment reflects the plight of rightholders deprived of remedies 
in their country and the obstacles they face in seeking justice in 
the home country. This attention to remedies is captured in the 
UNGPs;7 the current work of the OHCHR on the access to 
remedies;8 the two resolutions of 2014 adopted by the UN Human 
Rights Council;9 the French legislative proposal seeking to 
establish a duty of vigilance on French parent companies;10 and, 
of course, the constant preoccupation of civil society groups 
pushing for corporate accountability.11  
                                                                                                     
address actual and potential adverse human rights impacts, business 
enterprises should first seek to prevent and mitigate those that are most severe 
or where delayed response would make them irremediable.”); see also Salient 
Human Rights Issues, UN GUIDING PRINCIPLES REPORTING FRAMEWORK, 
http://www.ungpreporting.org/key-concepts/salient-human-rights-issues/ (last 
visited Mar. 9, 2016) (“The UN Guiding Principles  Reporting Framework asks 
companies to focus their human rights reporting on their ‘salient human rights 
issues.’”)  (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 7. See Guiding Principles, supra note 6, at 26 (“States should take 
appropriate steps to ensure the effectiveness of domestic judicial mechanisms 
when addressing business-related human rights abuses, including considering 
ways to reduce legal, practical and other relevant barriers that could lead to a 
denial of access to remedy.”). 
 8. See OCHR Programme of Work to Enhance Accountability and Access 
to Remedy in Cases of Business Involvement in Human Rights Abuses, OFFICE 
OF THE UN HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR HUMAN RIGHTS (OHCHR), 
http://www.ohchr.org/EN/Issues/Business/Pages/OverviewOfProjects.aspx (last 
visited Mar. 9, 2016) (providing an overview of the OHCHR’s work on remedies 
for human rights abuses in business operations) (on file with the Washington 
and Lee Law Review). 
 9.  Human Rights Council, Elaboration of an International Legally 
Binding Instrument on Transnational Corporations and Other Business 
Enterprises with Respect to Human Rights, A/HRC/26/L.22/Rev.1 (24 June 
2014) (setting up an Intergovernmental Group with the mandate “to elaborate 
an international legally binding instrument to regulate, in international human 
rights law, the activities of Transnational Corporations and Other Business 
Enterprises”). Human Rights Council, Human Rights and Transnational 
Corporations and Other Business Enterprises, A/HRC/26/L.1 (23 June 2014) 
(emphasizing the continuing the implementation of UNGPs as well as the issue 
of improved access to remedy, “including the benefits and limitations of a legally 
binding instrument”). 
 10. Danielle Auroi et al., Rapport Relative au Devoir de Vigilance des 
Sociétés Mères et des Entreprises Donneuses D’ordre, ASSEMBLÉE NATIONALE 
(Jan. 21, 2015), http://www.assemblee-nationale.fr/14/rapports/r2504.asp (last 
visited June 4, 2016) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 11. See generally GWYNNE SKINNER, ROBERT MCCORQUODALE, & OLIVIER DE 
SCHUTTER, THE THIRD PILLAR: ACCESS TO JUDICIAL REMEDIES FOR HUMAN RIGHTS 
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Skinner’s contribution is doubtlessly ambitious as it seeks a 
strong regulatory regime; the fact that her approach is carefully 
delimited is helpful in the uphill battle to get acceptance for this 
legislative proposal. Thus Skinner’s treatment is well-judged not 
only in what the proposal does but also in what it refrains from 
doing. Skinner is disinclined to expand this regulatory reasoning 
to the whole range of human rights through hard law tools of a 
coercive nature. In other words, she pursues what I called 
elsewhere a “narrow approach” to legalization, as contrasted to 
an “expansive approach” often embraced by human rights 
advocates.12 The latter approach comes with its own trappings 
and is worth reflecting on in more detail in order to place 
Skinner’s analysis in the wider context of legalizing corporate 
responsibilities. 
For the legally inclined, strong regulatory proposals are 
attractive. They appear indispensable for moving the BHR field 
beyond ‘soft law’ and ‘corporate voluntarism’ and to ensure 
through coercive means that the minimum standards of human 
dignity enshrined in human rights are observed in the face of 
powerful profit-making motives and intense market competition. 
However, to make legalization proposals like Skinner’s truly 
compelling and appreciated, the clear delimitations that Skinner 
performs should be duly noted and, I would suggest, also 
supplemented with a different legalization perspective; the latter 
should be able to cover the rest of the BHR field left untouched by 
Skinner’s proposal and also explain why such strong legalization 
is unfeasible outside the territory Skinner carefully delineated. I 
assume here that some readers will still be tempted to apply 
more widely Skinner’s strong legalization proposal—to the entire 
range of human rights and to all forms of direct and indirect 
involvement in abuse—in their search for holding MNEs legally 
accountable and offering remedies to victims. The dangers I 
perceive in such expansive treatments of corporate legal 
                                                                                                     
VIOLATIONS BY TRANSNATIONAL BUSINESS (2013) (arguing for corporate 
accountability for human rights violations). 
 12. See Radu Mares, Legalizing Human Rights Due Diligence and the Legal 
Separation of Entities, in A Treaty on Business and Human Rights? Exploring 
its Contours  (Surya Deva & David Bilchitz eds., forthcoming 2016) (reviewing 
several streams of human rights works for the way in which they account for, 
and deal with, the legal separation of entities principle). 
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accountability consist of losing sight of first-order principles 
relevant to the transnational BHR domain.  
This rejoinder places Skinner’s analysis in a wider context to 
reflect on the legalization of the entire BHR field (encompassing 
all human rights as well as direct and indirect forms of MNE 
involvement in abuse) and on the historical evolution of legal 
reasoning around MNE responsibilities during the last two 
decades.  
Below I outline three “baselines” that were drawn in the mid-
2000s, in 2011, and the present that shape our thinking on the 
legalization of the BHR field and of corporate responsibilities. 
The first baseline is the result of the “classical international 
human rights law” mindset powerfully exposed in the UN Draft 
Norms13 developed in the early 2000s and shelved in 2004 after 
encountering fatal opposition from states and businesses.14 This 
was a legalistic project to expand the reach of international 
human rights law (IHRL) by defining expansive MNE obligations 
that mirrored the state’s human rights obligations. The second 
baseline is marked by the UN mandate of John Ruggie, who 
dismissed the Norms and the entire legalistic approach of the 
previous period.15 He came with a radically different take on 
global governance—and the role of international law therein16—
as well as a new conceptual strategy to shape business conduct.17 
As the UNGPs received unanimous endorsement in the Human 
Rights Council, a second baseline was drawn in 2011. However, 
the legalization discussion was soon back on the UN table with a 
                                                                                                     
 13. Norms on the Responsibilities of Transnational Corporations and Other 
Business Enterprises with Regard to Human Rights, U.N. Doc. 
E/CN.4/Sub.2/2003/38/Rev.2 (Aug. 26, 2003) [hereinafter UN Draft Norms].  
 14.  Comm’n on Human Rights, Report of the Sub-Commission on the 
Promotion and Protection of Human Rights, ¶¶18–22, E/CN.4/2005/91 (Feb. 15, 
2005). 
 15. See generally, e.g., John Gerard Ruggie, Business and Human Rights: 
The Evolving International Agenda, 101 AM. J. INT’L L. 819 (2007) (criticizing 
the Norms). 
 16. See id. at 840 (“[T]he interplay between systems of legal compliance 
and the broader social dynamics that can contribute to positive change needs to 
be carefully calibrated.”). 
 17. See id. (“[T]he focal point in the business and human rights debate 
needs to expand beyond establishing individual corporate liability for 
wrongdoing.”). 
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resolution adopted in 2014.18 The resolution set up an Inter-
Governmental Working Group dedicated to exploring an 
international legal instrument for BHR. The entire debate 
associated with its work is currently drawing a third legalization 
baseline. This setup offers an opportunity to take stock of the 
impact of the Ruggie mandate and a changing international 
business context. Arguably the choice for the legally inclined is 
either to revert to the first baseline drawn in the mid-2000s or 
come to terms with a more complex legalization perspective 
consistent with the thinking behind the UNGPs.  
 
II. The First Baseline: The Legalistic Approach Behind the UN 
Draft Norms 
It could be said that the deliberately narrow coverage of 
Skinner’s proposal absorbed the lessons of the UN Draft Norms. 
One could highlight the important works of Clapham, De 
Schutter and Weissbrodt as capturing the Zeitgeist of early 2000s 
where prominent human rights lawyers were driving the 
standard setting efforts of the UN on corporate human rights 
responsibilities. For example, Clapham’s monography Human 
Rights Obligations of Non-State Actors places the discussion of 
MNE responsibilities and their legalization in the wider debates 
about ever-accelerating economic globalization.19 Clapham 
captures vividly the discussions of the time on whether 
globalization entails the demise of the state, and how market 
freedom, privatization, and deregulation risked acquiring the 
status of sacrosanct values.20 The book evokes the struggles of 
human rights lawyers to preserve the human rights gains of the 
last half-century in the face of increased economic 
interdependencies managed by powerful economic international 
organizations and spearheaded by MNEs.21  
                                                                                                     
 18. See supra note 9 (discussing the UN Human Rights Council’s 
resolutions). 
 19. See generally ANDREW CLAPHAM, HUMAN RIGHTS OBLIGATIONS OF NON-
STATE ACTORS (2006). 
 20. Id. at 9, 12. 
 21. Id. at 137–270. 
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In the approach formalized in the UN Draft Norms, the 
writers sought evidence of how IHRL “is developing” to cover non-
state actors such as companies.22 This “expansive” approach had 
a few traits that are worth singling out here in order to pinpoint 
some key differences with the later UN mandate of John Ruggie 
and the UNGPs. The thinking behind the Norms was to reapply 
the respect-protect-fulfill categories of human rights obligations 
falling on states; to look at complicity as the concept able to 
trigger the parent company’s responsibility when affiliates 
infringed rights as the parent company “contributed” or 
“benefited” from abuses; to embrace sphere of influence as the 
limiting concept for corporate responsibilities; and to put faith in 
the traditional international rule-making process often starting 
with states endorsing a “soft law” instrument expected to 
subsequently harden into law through an international treaty 
and national regulations. These traits are discussed and 
illustrated below.  
For example, David Weissbrodt, one of the main drafters of 
the Norms, presented the Norms as a restatement of IHRL.23 The 
Norms use a symmetrical, identical formulation of state and 
corporate responsibilities.24 Andrew Clapham pursued a 
likeminded project of reapplying IHRL obligations to new 
actors.25 Indeed, this was an effort to obtain a consistent and 
uniform international human rights law system where all 
actors—state and non-state—bearing human rights obligations; 
the same respect-protect-fulfill categories of obligations 
                                                                                                     
 22. See supra note 19, at 222.  
 23. See David Weissbrodt & Muria Kruger, Norms on the Responsibilities of 
Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises with Regard to 
Human Rights, 97 AM. J. INT’L L. 901, 901, 911 (2003)  
The Norms represent a landmark step in holding businesses 
accountable for their human rights abuses and constitute a succinct, 
but comprehensive, restatement of the international legal principles 
applicable to businesses with regard to human rights. . . . 
[The] Norms largely reflect, restate, and refer to existing 
international norms, in addition to specifying some basic methods for 
implementation. . . . The legal authority of the Norms derives 
principally from their sources in treaties and customary international 
law, as a restatement of international legal principles applicable to 
companies. 
 24. See UN Draft Norms, supra note 13, art. 1. 
 25.  See CLAPHAM, supra note 19. 
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applicable to states would be relevant to companies too. Thus, 
Clapham resisted a narrowing of non-state actors’ responsibilities 
down to “respect” only, as Sigrun Skogly suggested it would be 
appropriate for the obligations of international financial 
institutions.26 Instead, he found support in customary law to say 
that one should avoid directly violating and being complicit in 
someone else’s violation.27  
To grasp the “expansive” approach that Clapham and others 
used to define corporate human rights responsibilities, one 
notices the key tool: the notion of complicity. Known in criminal 
law, complicity is the concept that is always stretched beyond 
legal notions of aiding and abetting (legal complicity) to cover 
non-legal dimensions of wrongful association with the wrongdoer 
(“beneficial” and “silent” complicity).28 Indeed, as Clapham wrote, 
complicity “is not confined to direct involvement in the immediate 
plotting and execution of illegal acts by others,”29 but also 
describes when a business benefits from human rights abuses 
committed by someone else. This is recognized in the Draft 
Norms, which clarify broad principles: Do not contribute, benefit, 
and inform yourself of activities so you can further avoid 
complicity.30 It is this “accordion” concept of complicity—a 
secondary liability principle or scheme of attribution—that helps 
Clapham and other legal thinkers justify the entire respect-
protect-fulfill range of corporate responsibilities; it helps in the 
task of reapplying IHRL to businesses and achieving consistency 
for an IHRL system that shall bind public and private actors to 
observe human rights.  
However, not only does complicity overly expand the scope of 
obligations, but reliance on this concept also fails to guide 
thinking on legalizing the BHR field. Such choices put Clapham 
in the unfortunate position to identify, but not use, the doctrine of 
“reckless disregard,”31 a concept much more able to cover entire 
                                                                                                     
 26. Id. at 150–51. 
 27. Id. at 151. 
 28. Andrew Clapham & Scott Jerbi, Categories of Corporate Complicity in 
Human Rights Abuses, 24 HASTINGS INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 339, 347 (2001). 
 29. Id.  
 30. CLAPHAM, supra note 19, at 220, 232–33. 
 31. Id. at 261. 
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supply chains and clarify responsibilities for situations of indirect 
involvement by parent companies with abusive affiliates. That 
doctrine of tort law would have highlighted a much wider set of 
factors and policy considerations relevant to attaching liability to 
companies for creating foreseeable risk and to guiding reasoning 
about the scope of MNE obligations. Projects like the Norms, 
however, derive strength from international law sources they 
seek to reapply to new settings. In contrast, “reckless disregard” 
and other negligence doctrines are to be found at the domestic 
law level only. Clapham and other BHR thinkers found it difficult 
to escape the attraction of complicity: it allows an expansive take 
on corporate responsibilities, but it is also a principle present in 
international law branches of state responsibility and criminal 
law that are congruent in their standards of complicity.  
For such writers engaged in the project of reapplying IHRL 
to the business sector and MNEs, the standards of liability were 
to come from international law, and the tool to secure their 
observance would be hard law, whether domestic laws or 
international laws. The Norms were seen as a declaratory 
instrument expected to harden into law, at national and 
international levels.32 Clearly the backers of the Draft Norms had 
in mind the usual transition from general principles to 
specification—from soft to hard law—in a process in which legal 
experts identify, interpret, and apply international legal 
principles of responsibility to corporations.33 As Olivier De 
Schutter wrote at the time of the Norms, “[a]lthough the final 
destination remains unknown, the general direction which we are 
taking emerges clearly from these developments.”34 However, 
pushing the limits of human rights responsibilities and of the 
complicity notion in order to hold MNEs legally accountable for 
entire value chains runs against first order principles of 
international law, human rights law, and business law, as 
                                                                                                     
 32. UN Draft Norms, supra note 13, art. 17. 
 33. For more on this topic, see generally Radu Mares, A Review of a Classic 
Book: Andrew Clapham, Human Rights Obligations of Non-State Actors, 1 BUS. 
& HUM. RTS. J. 379 (2016). 
 34. Olivier De Schutter, Transnational Corporations as Instruments of 
Human Development, in HUMAN RIGHTS AND DEVELOPMENT: TOWARDS MUTUAL 
REINFORCEMENT 403, 427 (Philip Alston & Mary Robinson eds., 2005).) 
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explained below.35 It builds on the illusion that the expansion of 
corporate responsibilities happens in “virgin territory” ready to be 
conquered by legal interpretive maneuvers, rather than in 
territory densely populated by first order principles. 
Such legalization of corporate responsibilities was of course 
meant to signify a break with the ‘voluntarism’ pervasive in the 
BHR area: States have adopted international soft law 
instruments on CSR (such as the OECD Guidelines and ILO 
Declaration and the UN Global Compact) and businesses creates 
codes of conduct (self-regulation by individual companies, by 
industry bodies, or by multistakeholder schemes). The undertone 
is that MNEs—profit-making, wealthy, and powerful entities—
could only be subject to harder versions of legalization able to 
deliver deterrence and remedies, in order to counterbalance 
extremely strong incentives flowing from their profit-making 
nature and competitive market environments. Any “weaker” 
instruments—whether “soft” law or less coercive regulations like 
transparency laws—would be valued as a mere step towards 
coercive regulatory frameworks or seen as inherently inadequate 
(and betraying lack of political will to hold businesses 
accountable). From here came a lasting difficulty for human 
rights lawyers to valorize softer legalization strategies in BHR. In 
his passionate challenge, Clapham noted that human rights 
lawyers would rather put faith in the current state-centered 
system rather than a new, unknown, diffuse accountability 
arrangement.36 Better to preserve the current state focus of 
international human rights law and augment it with a state duty 
to protect and citizen participation, than move to law as 
“multiplicity of communicative ‘processes,’ ‘world law,’ or 
‘multilevel governance.’”37 States should make international law 
and private actors should not enter law-making in an unmediated 
fashion.38 
Perhaps a minority of human rights writers looked beyond 
the well-documented corporate abuses and clear threats that the 
global economy and MNE operations were posing to human 
                                                                                                     
 35. Infra Part IV.A. 
 36. CLAPHAM, supra note 19, at 25. 
 37. Id. at 26–27. 
 38. Id. at 25, 27. 
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rights. Clapham for example, entertained the possibility that 
globalization might stimulate new forms of accountability as “top-
down effects of more open markets for transnational actors” 
coexist with bottom-up demands of civil society groups and 
networks: “One could start to exploit the dynamics to ensure 
better respect for human rights.”39 It was an illustration of his 
optimistic belief that IHRL standards are only contingently based 
on the international law, state-centered architecture and are 
inherently capable to adapt to a more multi-layered global 
governance architecture. Therefore, Clapham challenged fellow 
lawyers to shed contingencies—historical and conceptual—and 
find new ways to cover non-state actors and protect the individual 
against violence from the state and private actors. Touching on 
the power dimension, De Schutter wrote in 2005 that:  
The power of transnational corporations fascinates. Our 
reaction to this power has been fed by much publicized 
situations in which, effectively controlled neither by 
their State or incorporation nor by the State where they 
operate, these global actors seemed to be able to commit 
human rights violations in complete impunity: our 
reaction has been to restrain that power, by imposing on 
transnational corporations obligations to comply with 
internationally recognized human rights. But, as we 
have discovered when we undertook to impose positive 
obligations on the State to protect and to fulfil [sic] 
human rights, power is not unidimensionally evil. It may 
also be exercised in the name of the good. TNCs could be 
seen also as a potential tool—and a powerful one no 
doubt—for the realization of the right to development.40  
Such insights into the openings that the global economy 
presents for observing human rights however never truly 
permeated and became operationalized in the legalization 
concepts of this period. The legalization project of holding MNEs 
accountable under international law became tightly entangled 
with moving accountability upwards towards the parent 
company, with states as indispensable players in the strategy of 
change, and with coercive legal strategies indispensable to outdo 
the profit motive and market pressures. These three reductionist 
                                                                                                     
 39. Id. at 7. 
 40. De Schutter, supra note 34, at 443. 
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biases characterize the first legalization baseline in BHR. They 
ensured that the legalization project would struggle to valorize 
softer legalization and non-legal strategies of change, to conceive 
MNEs playing a more constructive part in the strategy of change. 
The biases explain why legalizing the transnational BHR field 
might inherently require fewer linear regulatory regimes with 
multiple moving parts. The early 2000s period driven by a classic 
human rights law mindset found its expression in the UN Draft 
Norms. A first legalization baseline was drawn. The Norms did 
not find traction within the UN, and the mindset behind them 
was challenged head-on by a UN mandate-holder: John Ruggie, a 
political scientist specialized in international relations with vast 
UN experience. 
III. The Second Baseline: The Polycentric Approach Behind the 
UN Guiding Principles 
Appointed in 2005 as Special Representative of the Secretary 
General for business and human rights, Ruggie began by 
dismissing the UN Draft Norms as conceptually misconceived 
and strategically inadequate. Ruggie concluded the Norms made 
exaggerated legal claims in their mission to reapply IHRL to the 
private sector.41  Furthermore, the Norms got the equation 
wrong: Not overly broad corporate responsibilities for a limited 
range of human rights, but narrower responsibilities regarding 
all human rights.42 This is warranted given that business 
operations potentially infringe all human rights43 and that 
excessively broad obligations misconstrue the functional role of 
business in society. Fundamentally, not only did the treaty-
making aspirations behind the Norms appear to Ruggie as 
                                                                                                     
 41. See generally Ruggie, supra note 15.   
 42.  Human Rights Council, Protect, Respect and Remedy: a Framework for 
Business and Human Rights – Report of the Special Representative of the 
Secretary-General on the Issue of Human Rights and Transnational 
Corporations and Other Business Enterprises, John Ruggie, ¶ 51, U.N. Doc. 
A/HRC/8/5 (Apr. 7, 2008). 
 43.  Michael Wright, Corporations and Human Rights: A Survey of the 
Scope and Patterns of Alleged Corporate-Related Human Rights Abuse, 
Addendum to the SRSG’s Report to the Human Rights Council, U.N. Doc. 
A/HRC/8/5 (2008). 
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politically intractable and therefore doomed to fail if reattempted 
in his mandate,44 but he looked at the Norms as symptomatic of a 
misguided legalization mindset. He found inspiration in Amartya 
Sen’s work who, in Ruggie’s words, insisted that:  
[H]uman rights are much more than laws antecedents or 
progeny. Indeed, [Sen] states, such a view threatens to 
“incarcerate” the social logics and processes other than 
law that drive public recognition of rights. My work, 
including the Guiding Principles, has sought to 
contribute to the freeing of human rights discourse and 
practice from these conceptual shackles, by drawing on 
the interests, capacities and engagement of states, 
market actors, civil society, and the intrinsic power of 
ideational and normative factors.45 
In “polycentric governance” Ruggie saw the way forward to 
advance the cause of human rights in the global economy. Ruggie 
explained that in BHR, there are three systems that develop CSR 
standards and require their observance: “Public governance” 
encompassing law and policy, “corporate governance” reflecting 
risk management, and “civil governance” reflecting social 
expectations of stakeholders.46 For Ruggie, “the intellectual and 
policy challenge was to construct a conceptual and normative 
platform whereby the three governance systems become better 
aligned in relation to business and human rights, compensate for 
                                                                                                     
 44.  John Gerard Ruggie, Incorporating Human Rights: Lessons Learned, 
and Next Steps, in BUSINESS AND HUMAN RIGHTS: FROM PRINCIPLES TO PRACTICE 
(Justine Nolan & Dorothea Baumann-Pauly eds., forthcoming 2016) (explaining 
the “foundational logics” of his mandate and signalling his belief that if such 
“premises are ignored and the process reverts to prior conventional modalities, 
it could well revert to prior failures as well”). 
 45. John G. Ruggie, Life in the Global Public Domain: Response to 
Commentaries, JAMES G. STEWART (Feb. 5, 2015), http://jamesgstewart.com/life-
in-the-global-public-domain-response-to-commentaries/ (last visited Mar. 9, 
2016) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 46. See JOHN GERARD RUGGIE, JUST BUSINESS: MULTINATIONAL 
CORPORATIONS AND HUMAN RIGHTS xliii–xliv (2013) 
The most fundamental [aspect when developing the Guiding 
Principles] was to recognize and build on a core feature of the 
governance of multinational corporations . . . . Three distinct 
governance systems affect their conduct in relation to human rights: 
the system of public law . . . a civil governance system . . . and 
corporate governance. . . . [E]ach of these governance systems needs 
to be mobilized and pull in compatible directions. 
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one another’s shortcomings, and play mutually reinforcing roles 
from which cumulative change can evolve over time.”47  
By comparing the first baseline—Draft Norm’s legalistic 
approach—with the second baseline—Ruggie’s polycentric 
approach—a paradigmatic shift is notable. The shift Ruggie 
produced in BHR can be traced to three elements: First, the 
expansion of BHR governance beyond law achieved through the 
polycentric governance approach; second, the rather broad 
definition of corporate responsibilities that would include a 
MNE’s “leverage” over business partners; and third, the wrapping 
these elements in a credible narrative of human rights in the 
global economy—a multifaceted narrative that accounts for both 
risks and opportunities created as the world integrates 
economically. Each of these three elements will be expanded on 
below. By framing the international BHR field in a sufficiently 
broad and evolutionary way, Ruggie’s approach left space for 
further legalization. Ruggie’s correction to the BHR field 
eliminated the three reductionisms of the first baseline and 
clarified the necessity of a different legalization approach to 
follow up the UNGPs.  
First, the expansion of BHR governance beyond law through 
polycentric governance as the strategy of change was a strategic 
choice Ruggie made early on in his mandate in response to, and 
in stark contrast to, the legalization project of the first baseline. 
At once he eliminated two reductionisms that came to haunt the 
first baseline: Its complete reliance on state action to kick-start 
and fuel the evolution of BHR field and its inclination towards 
hard legalization, coercive regulations targeting MNEs. As shown 
above, these reductionisms made it difficult for the first baseline 
to move beyond rather raw versions of legal pluralism in BHR 
and to valorize softer legalization and non-legal incentives for 
change. 
Ruggie’s polycentric governance outlook contrasts with the 
classic international law approach of kick-starting the human 
rights project with a (comprehensive) international instrument 
that states would negotiate, ratify, and implement domestically, 
while international monitoring bodies would constantly interpret 
and further specify its provisions through “constructive dialogue” 
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with states and possibly individual complaint mechanisms. For 
Ruggie, the decades of states negotiating unsuccessfully an 
instrument on MNE responsibilities offered enough empirical 
evidence and motivation to break with a state-centered modality 
of rule-making and rule-enforcement in the BHR field. 
Polycentrism was the way forward to bypass state paralysis.  
As Ruggie lost the state-centric bias of the first baseline, that 
also eliminated the second reductionism of overdependence on 
hard legalization. Ruggie took issue with two “doctrinal 
positions”: “Only international legal measures can produce 
significant change” and “an overarching international legal 
framework through a single treaty instrument governing all 
aspects of transnational corporations in relation to human rights 
(‘a global constitution of sorts’).”48 As Ruggie bet on polycentrism, 
he naturally had no problem with accommodating softer 
legalization and non-legal incentives as drivers and facilitators of 
change in BHR. In contrast, the legalistic project could not truly 
make sense of non-coercive forms of state action. Softer 
legalization and soft law would be dismissed as inherently weak 
or seen as mere stepping stones towards hard, coercive law that 
would appear as the only adequate state/legal response to 
globalization, power and market pressures. 
Second, Ruggie’s definition of corporate responsibilities is 
narrower than the respect-protect-fulfill responsibility of the first 
baseline. Taking a closer look, however, Ruggie’s responsibility to 
respect human rights is still rather broad as it includes 
“leverage.” Ruggie thus maintained that each and every business, 
like any other actor, should—at the minimum—respect human 
rights. Notably, this corporate responsibility to not infringe 
human rights would not be a responsibility to refrain from harm 
imposed on each legal entity, but—for those influential entities, 
such as parent companies—would contain a responsibility to 
exercise leverage over the affiliates, and if needed, to terminate 
relationships with them. This incorporated in the corporate 
responsibility to respect what to human rights lawyers appears 
as a well-delimited responsibility to protect (similar to Skogly’s 
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proposal that Clapham dismissed).49 As a result, Ruggie’s 
corporate responsibility would not be indefensibly narrow and out 
of touch with social expectations from MNEs to clean up their act 
and their value chains. While the first baseline sought to reapply 
categories of obligations well established in IHRL, Ruggie sought 
a concept of responsibility that is more attuned to the functional 
role of business in society and went for “respect” only.  
This eliminated another reductionism inherent in the first 
baseline: the delocalization and upward allocation of liability to 
parent companies for abuses of human rights throughout value 
chains. Deliberately Ruggie resisted such a narrowing of the BHR 
discourse. The first baseline moved in this direction by working 
the scheme of attribution—mainly by using the “accordion” 
concept complicity—and constantly gravitating towards stricter 
forms of liability for the parent company, seen as the default 
responsible party when affiliates infringe human rights.50 The 
overall thrust was coming perilously close to holding the parent 
company liable more or less by default. Instead, Ruggie’s more 
limited corporate responsibility including a responsibility to 
exercise leverage in global value chains not only eliminated a 
reductionism of the first baseline, but opened the way for 
expanding the BHR field of vision to the responsibilities of other 
actors able to exercise leverage on value chains through legal, 
policy and non-legal incentives: host and home states, IGOs, 
NGOs, market participants and all other stakeholders. This 
expansion was further enabled by a multifaceted narrative of 
globalization that Ruggie put forward. 
Third, the narrative in which the actors and tools for change 
(states and coercive law in the first baseline versus the 
polycentrism and a fuller toolbox in the second baseline) couple 
with the corporate responsibility (very broad in first the baseline 
and reasonably broad in the second baseline) is another 
determinant factor that ensured the legacy of the Ruggie 
mandate. The first baseline was predisposed to confine itself to 
coercive law and to allocate liability to the parent company. The 
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 50. See UN Draft Norms, supra note 13 (addressing the responsibilities of 
transnational corporations and business entities throughout). 
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narrative predisposed to lean against markets, globalization, 
corporate power/size, home states, and MNEs compounded a 
restricted view on BHR. As quoted above, Clapham and De 
Schutter took tentative steps away from this direction and began 
inquiring about the new opportunities brought by globalization 
and MNEs to promote respect for human rights and the right to 
development.51 However, embracing the brand of legalism of the 
first baseline seeking to reapply IHRL to companies hindered 
their efforts. The result was a uni-dimensional view of the global 
economy and its relation to the observance of human rights. A 
rather restricted legalization perspective followed.  
In contrast, Ruggie’s project was not a legalistic one, to begin 
with, and it was not about making the buck stop with the parent 
companies. Ruggie’s project would be one of mobilizing many 
more sources of leverage for the protection of human rights, 
rather than moving liability upwards towards the parent 
company. To succeed, this “leverage project” would require a 
multifaceted narrative of globalization that accounted explicitly 
for its threats and opportunities for protecting human rights 
transnationally.52 Even before his SRSG mandate, Ruggie would 
state that his main intellectual interest was in new transnational 
arrangements that intersect to address global governance gaps.53 
In this way, Ruggie’s approach invited a more nuanced 
legalization perspective to support his project of harvesting 
leverage for human rights in an interconnected global economy. 
                                                                                                     
 51. See supra notes 34–40 and accompanying text (discussing the 
legalization of corporate responsibilities). 
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With the conclusion of the SRSG mandate—and the UNGPs 
endorsed by the UN and many other stakeholders—the next steps 
are about specification of the UNGPs to particular settings as 
well as legalization, which is one form of institutionalizing BHR. 
Legal incentives are much needed to move companies towards 
compliance. Having cleared the BHR field of the reductionisms of 
the first baseline, Ruggie’s polycentrism comes with the 
enormous task of securing alignment and mutual reinforcement 
among the three governance systems.54 States and legalization 
will have a significant part to play in this task and it will be for 
the third legalization baseline to provide answers.  
But before delving in this third baseline, it is important to 
note Ruggie’s position on legalization. Commenting on the 
international legalization process the UN commenced in 2014, 
Ruggie wrote: “As the business and human rights agenda 
continues to evolve, further legalization is an inevitable and 
necessary component of future developments. But in light of the 
failure of past treaty efforts in this domain, we need to ask 
ourselves what form legalization should take at the international 
level.”55 Ruggie favored legalization: “Further international 
legalization in business and human rights is inevitable as well as 
being desirable in order to close global governance gaps. About 
that there can be little doubt. The critical questions are how to 
get from here to there, and in what direction the ‘there’ should 
lie.”56 He emphasized the importance of NGO leadership: “[W]hen 
states are this divided and ambivalent, NGO leadership is badly 
needed. Hence, NGOs need to reflect on their own positioning.”57 
He also warned that a workable legalization perspective is 
essential: “[I]f there is to be any hope of further international 
legalization in the business and human rights domain, civil 
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 55. Ruggie, supra note 44. 
 56. John G. Ruggie, Get Real or We'll Get Nothing: Reflections on the First 
Session of the Intergovernmental Working Group on a Business and Human 
Rights Treaty, BUS. & HUMAN RIGHTS RESOURCE CTR., http://business-
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society needs to help by advancing workable proposals that states 
cannot ignore or dismiss out of hand.”58 He thus highlighted the 
perils of not having a sound legalization perspective:  
Such demands are so far removed from reality that they 
become playthings for some states, and reasons for 
others to ignore the process. To avoid being 
instrumentalized in this fashion and to provide the 
needed leadership, NGOs would serve the business and 
human rights agenda well by re-examining and refining 
their platform.59 
In sum, the contrast between the first and second baselines 
in BHR becomes clearer. However worthwhile the conceptual 
efforts of international lawyers elaborating corporate human 
rights responsibilities in a globalizing economy and however 
justified and urgent the attention to negative impacts on human 
rights by institutions driving the global economy, this paradigm 
succumbed to several forms of reductionism wrapped in a uni-
dimensional narrative of globalization. As Ruggie came with his 
polycentric governance narrative and a reasonably broad 
corporate responsibility, he drew a second baseline that 
eliminated those reductionisms and thus reset the BHR field. 
That made it easier to think of BHR in a broader and conceptual 
way (not a declaratory manner) and to seek new openings and 
interactions able to maximize leverage for human rights (not 
remain faithful to a legalization paradigm that might be ill-
equipped to detect and account for such openings and 
interactions).  
Ruggie came with a BHR paradigm that was not about 
elaborating MNE’s (legal) responsibilities, but was a 
comprehensive paradigm about summoning leverage and 
directing it through old and new pathways across borders. This 
aligned with a stream of literature sensitive to the limits of both 
law and CSR60 that tried to link private and public governance in 
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RIGHTS AND THE GLOBAL ECONOMY (2009); DAVID VOGEL, THE MARKET FOR 
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a new BHR paradigm. In sum, the BHR narrative that Ruggie 
began to articulate appears better attuned to promoting human 
rights in a transnational value chain context than that of 
predecessors and requires a more nuanced and complex 
legalization perspective. Ruggie’s polycentric approach was not 
an alternative to legalization favoring voluntarism; it was an 
alternative to the legalistic project of the first baseline. It might 
prove the better way to kick-start the evolution of the BHR 
regime and to think more deeply about the regulatory mixes 
appropriate in this transnational BHR context. Arguably the 
challenge for the third baseline is about adding a legalization 
layer to the UNGPs in a way that avoids replicating the 
reductionisms of the first baseline. It is about imagining a new 
legalization perspective that complements and builds on the 
UNGPs rather than reverse thinking back to the first baseline. 
IV. The Third Baseline: The Two-Track, Multi-Channel 
Legalization Perspective 
Since 2014, the legalization discussion is back on the UN 
agenda and a third baseline will be drawn. Two questions could 
be asked: (1) What has changed in the global economy in the last 
10 years since the first legalization baseline was drawn that 
might suggest the need for a different legalization perspective? 
(2) How would this new legalization perspective relate to the 
second baseline drawn by the Ruggie mandate?  
A. The Context of the Third Legalization Baseline 
Regarding what has changed in the global economy, one 
could start by referring to Ruggie’s observations regarding the 
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shifting BHR context. In a speech made to the 2014 UN Forum on 
Business and Human Rights, Ruggie drew attention to some key 
“characteristics of the institutional landscape that any attempt at 
further legalization needs to bear in mind if it is to have any 
practical effect.”61 One aspect regards the MNE that “no longer 
falls easily into the North-South cleavage.”62 “One of the most 
profound global geo-economic shifts today is the rapid increase of 
transnational corporations based in so-called emerging 
markets.”63 Another aspect is that the MNEs 
are no longer the entities they once were: vertically 
integrated, multidivisional organizations structured in 
the form of a pyramid. The 21st century transnational 
corporation is a far more complex economic entity. In 
addition to its traditional relationships with 
subsidiaries, joint ventures are commonplace, many with 
state-owned or other national companies. But the biggest 
change has occurred through non-equity relationships. 
Here what you see today is the corporation as a bundle of 
contracts . . . .64  
Yet another aspect is that state adherence to human rights is 
uneven, which has consequences on a comprehensive BHR treaty:  
Not all states that can make the biggest difference have 
signed on to the full range of human right standards. 
Those who haven’t are unlikely to impose them on their 
corporations as a matter of hard law. That not only 
results in an ineffective treaty, of which there are many. 
It also risks undermining the broad state support 
achieved by the Guiding Principles for addressing all 
internationally recognized rights at the level of policy 
and practice.65  
Assessing the current BHR context could continue by 
accounting more broadly for recent promising developments in a 
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multitude of policy fields, fields that have a direct or indirect 
bearing on BHR and MNE responsibilities. Elsewhere, in an 
attempt to arrive at a more comprehensive and updated picture of 
the BHR policy context, I accounted for five policy streams: 
international trade law, development aid, international human 
rights law, home state laws with extraterritorial effects, and 
corporate social responsibility.66 New openings are appearing in 
the BHR landscape as some experiments come to maturity (e.g., 
in CSR) or new policies that were almost inconceivable years ago 
are a reality now (e.g., in trade agreements, including labor 
clauses and home states’ regulations of MNEs). Overall, it is 
notable that human rights appear as a legitimate concern in old 
and new transnational policy channels. Traditional channels 
promoting human rights, such as the international human rights 
law system and development aid, are more focused now on BHR. 
Significantly, economic channels that previously shunned human 
rights concerns have evolved: trade agreements and the value 
chains of MNEs have progressed to incorporating more and better 
human rights safeguards.  
Also, some excesses of international economic law and policy 
are being addressed. Thus, reflecting on recent developments, 
Sauvant noted a recalibration and evolution of legal investment 
regimes:  
[D]uring the 1970s and early 1980s, the watchword was 
“control,” while during the later 1980s and 1990s, 
“liberalization” at the national level and “protection” at 
the international level was viewed as most important. 
Since 2000, national policies have become more nuanced, 
international guidelines have been strengthened and 
new ones added, and some agreements have become 
more cautious, although an increasing number is aiming 
for more liberalization. Rule making may therefore be 
haphazard, messy and uneven, depending on what is 
needed and what is feasible in a given constellation of 
interests and forces. But, hopefully, over time, the 
combination of various instruments add up to a regime 
that covers, comprehensively and in a balanced manner, 
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the range of issues related to international investment, 
including issues related to human rights.67 
The argument so far emphasized some structural 
transformations in the landscape of MNEs as well as promising 
developments in various policy fields bearing on BHR. Beginning 
to draw the third legalization baseline requires keeping abreast 
of such changes and a sharpened sensitivity to a rapidly evolving 
context for BHR. But the third legalization baseline should pay 
attention also to the specific context of transnational BHR. This 
is the third prong of the contextual analysis in this section.  
The transnational BHR context presents peculiarities and 
poses challenges for policymakers that are significantly different 
from a purely domestic context of a local company employing local 
workers and supplying the domestic market. Regulating to secure 
human rights in the transnational BHR context requires the 
strengthening of two sets of laws: domestic and transnational. 
Domestic laws in host countries mainly target affiliates of MNEs 
for their harmful practices through the usual labor laws, 
environmental protection laws, land laws, civil laws, and criminal 
laws. Laws with transnational effects adopted in home states 
target parent companies for their impacts abroad through 
reporting laws, due diligence regulations, and civil and criminal 
laws for offences committed overseas. Much of the regulation of 
MNEs discussions obviously deal with the transnational laws 
aspects; such home states’ laws appear as an important part of 
the emerging BHR regime, are at the heart of the project of 
holding MNEs accountable, and are essential for closing the 
jurisdictional and governance gaps that MNEs sometime exploit. 
However, promoting the adoption of such home state laws with 
transnational effects comes with its own challenges. Therefore 
the specificity of the transnational BHR context needs to be 
recognized. Here, I propose not losing sight of three “first order 
principles,” or foundational aspects that should not be overlooked, 
of public international law, business law, and international 
human rights law. 
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To pinpoint the application of these three principles and how 
they affect the third legalization baseline, it is important to recall 
that the UNGPs defined a reasonably broad corporate 
responsibility, which rightly encompasses direct and indirect 
involvement of MNEs in human rights abuses. Through Principle 
13, the UNGPs make a distinction between direct involvement in 
the form of causality and contribution (complicity) situations 
where the company is expected to cease harmful conduct and 
remediate the harm, and situations of indirect involvement in the 
form of lesser contributions or no causality at all (“beneficial and 
silent complicity” in Clapham’s categorization)68 where the 
company should exercise leverage over business partners or 
terminate the relationship. This distinction is of high relevance to 
the project of legalizing parent company responsibilities. For 
direct involvement, coercive legal solutions could be adopted to 
compel the company to desist and remedy the harm caused; for 
situations of indirect involvement such hard legalization options 
are problematic.  
The reason for difficulty in this “indirect involvement” regime 
has to do with three “first order principles” of the transnational 
BHR setting: legal separation of entities (business law), state 
sovereignty (international law), and protection of rightholders by 
legislative and other measures (international human rights law). 
These principles are inescapable in a transnational BHR context 
because of the possibility—or even likelihood—that global value 
chains will redirect should the parent company be held legally 
liable for failure to exercise leverage over business partners. 
Indeed, the parent company would be asked to monitor and 
influence its affiliates as a matter of legal obligation; if this 
obligation is backed by a hard sanction such as major fine or 
liability for harm, it is possible that the company will chose to 
comply by redirecting value chains away from high-risk zones.  
In a nutshell,69 one can assume that proposals to hold MNEs 
accountable bore fruit. A home state will thus impose on its 
MNEs a legal obligation to exercise leverage over affiliates to 
ensure observance of human rights through its value chains. If 
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the obligation has a broad scope (to cover indirect involvement in 
abuse) and is stringently enforced with strong liabilities, this will 
remove the protection offered by the legal separation principle on 
which companies rely to take risks and expand operations. This 
offers the choice to the MNE to comply with its obligation by 
redirecting its value chains away from states with problematic 
human rights records. This compliance decision in effect would 
penalize those states and restrict the possibility of such sovereign 
states to integrate in global value chains as they seek economic 
growth and national development. Furthermore, if value chains 
get redirected, this could harm rather than assist the 
rightholders by narrowing their opportunities to seek a better 
life. Such undesirable and unintended effects would run counter 
to a first order principle of IHRL that seeks increased protection 
of rightholders. Indeed, IHRL requires states to take the full 
range of measures, legislative and other measures, to secure 
respect for human rights. This principle is also recognizable in 
the UNGPs as they seek established and new modalities to amass 
maximum leverage to increase the protection of rightholders. The 
redirection of value chains would foreclose a set of measures and 
leverage that could be used to improve protection of human 
rights. 
Highlighting these three first order principles relevant for 
situations of indirect involvement of MNEs in rights abuses 
begins to problematize the use hard legalization strategies 
towards MNEs as a way to harvest MNE leverage. It boils down 
to an uncomfortable dilemma looming over the third legalization 
baseline: hard legalization in search of MNE accountability 
creates frictions with the three principles, and softer legalization 
might simply be insufficient to change MNE behavior and to 
make a significant contribution to securing human rights. So 
between backfiring and insignificance, the third legalization 
baseline requires a more complex regulatory understanding than 
merely (coercively) legalizing the responsibility to exercise HRDD 
of MNEs. This would depart from the simplistic message that 
legalization is merely about turning soft law (UNGPs) into hard 
law, and that law should be coercive enough to overcome the 
profit motive, the market competition dynamics, and the power of 
MNEs. The transnational BHR setting is different from a 
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domestic corporate accountability setting because of the three 
first order principles. 
To briefly exemplify all three first order principles, frictions 
with the state sovereignty of both home and host states can be 
detected in previous hard legalization attempts. The 1996 
Massachusetts ban on public procurement from companies 
operating in Myanmar created disputes between the US and 
European states.70 The Alien Tort Claims Act (ATCA) litigation 
also raised extraterritoriality concerns from other home states of 
MNEs.71 Regulating MNEs to protect human rights abroad might 
also create frictions with the sovereignty of host states, as the 
OECD Guidelines’ reference to protectionism shows.72 Drawing 
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into question the comparative advantage of any country where multinational 
enterprises invest.” OECD, OECD GUIDELINES FOR MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISES 
18 (2011). Furthermore,  
[g]overnments have the right to prescribe the conditions under which 
multinational enterprises operate within their jurisdictions, subject 
to international law. The entities of a multinational enterprise 
located in various countries are subject to the laws applicable in these 
countries. When multinational enterprises are subject to conflicting 
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on his experience during his six-year UN mandate on BHR, 
Ruggie wrote: “[S]tate conduct makes it abundantly clear that 
they do not regard extraterritoriality to be an acceptable means 
to address violations of the entire array of internationally 
recognized human rights. It makes little difference whether the 
states in question are located in the North, South, East, or 
West.”73  
Some human rights proposals, such as those contained in the 
2011 Maastricht Principles, see the extraterritorial obligations on 
home states to hold their MNEs accountable for infringements of 
human rights abroad as the “missing link” of the IHRL 
architecture.74 While these Principles do not seem much 
concerned with possible frictions with host state sovereignty,75 
other scholars are much more cautious in this respect.76  
One could argue that such objections grounded in 
extraterritoriality would be solved by an international treaty on 
BHR. Indeed, host and home states would consent and define 
acceptable transnational effects of home state laws, clearly 
separating thus legitimate from illegitimate exercises of 
extraterritorial authority through regulating MNEs. However, a 
first hurdle must be overcome by persuading both home and host 
                                                                                                     
requirements by adhering countries or third countries, the 
governments concerned are encouraged to co-operate in good faith 
with a view to resolving problems that may arise. 
Id. 
 73. Ruggie, supra note 56. 
 74.  ETOS, MAASTRICHT PRINCIPLES ON EXTRATERRITORIAL OBLIGATIONS OF 
STATES IN THE AREA OF ECONOMIC, SOCIAL AND CULTURAL RIGHTS 3 (Jan. 2013).  
 75.  For a discussion of this issue, see generally Mares, supra note 12. 
 76. Larry Catá Backer found the extraterritorial obligations strategy “to 
close a structural regulatory gap—by unleashing the particularized interests of 
states against enterprises operating within the territories of other states unable 
or unwilling to conform to the desires of the intervening state” deeply troubling. 
Larry Catá Backer, An Institutional Role for Civil Society Within the U.N. 
Guiding Principles?: Comments on César Rodríguez-Garavito and Tatiana 
Andia Business and Human Rights: Beyond the End of the Beginning, BROWN U. 
(Mar. 10, 2014), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2407787. Another scholar, 
Janet Dine, sought to pre-empt extraterritoriality objections to extraterritorial 
obligations of home state to regulate parent. Therefore, she proposed that the 
parent company should be obliged to require adherence at least to local 
standards and to report why it is necessary to depart from the standards of the 
home state. See CLAPHAM, supra note 19, at 239.  
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states to take on the risk of being left out of global value chains, 
as MNEs might redirect their operations as a compliance 
strategy. 
The human rights principle of protecting rightholders 
through legislative and other measures creates its own 
implications for hard legalization attempts. Arguably, after the 
HRC’s unanimous endorsement of the UNGPs, the overriding aim 
in the BHR field is to mobilize all forms of private and public 
leverage to systematically increase the protection of the 
rightholder. Ruggie’s “principled pragmatism” approach77 and the 
polycentric governance outlook was an expression of this 
principle. Rightholders and those acting in their support can see 
redirecting value chains away from high risk zones as generally 
unproductive and therefore desirable only as a last resort or in 
rather extreme circumstances.  
Such unintended effects of legalization of MNE’s 
responsibilities for their indirect involvement in abuses were 
visible on several occasions. Even the relatively undemanding 
transparency requirements of the 2010 Dodd-Frank Act (US) on 
minerals imported from the Democratic Republic of the Congo 
lead buyers to stop sourcing some of their minerals from the 
DRC.78 From a human rights perspective, remaining in a 
business relationship and exercising leverage is preferable to 
disengagement, as clearly reflected in the UNGPs79 and UN 
Norms.80 
                                                                                                     
 77.  Ruggie embraced a “principled form of pragmatism: an unflinching 
commitment to the principle of strengthening the promotion and protection of 
human rights as it relates to business, coupled with a pragmatic attachment to 
what works best in creating change where it matters most – in the daily lives of 
people.” Interim Report of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General on 
the Issue of Human Rights and Transnational Corporations and Other Business 
Enterprises, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2006/97, ¶ 81 (2006). 
 78. The EU, as it contemplated legalizing parent company’s responsibilities 
regarding conflict minerals in conflict-torn DRC, noted: “We want to avoid 
companies disengaging from such regions as an easy way to comply with the 
Regulation.” Frequently Asked Questions: Responsible Sourcing of Minerals 
Originating Conflict-Affected and High-Risk Areas: Towards an Integrated EU 
Approach, EUROPEAN COMM’N (Mar. 5, 2014), http://europa.eu/rapid/press-
release_MEMO-14-157_en.htm (last visited May 22, 2016) (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 79. Principle 19, Commentary, clarifies that the responsible course of 
action for a company that does not cause or contribute to infringements, is first 
to exercise leverage, and second to disengage from that abusive suppliers. This 
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Finally, regarding the legal separation of entities principle, 
recent noteworthy judgments about parent company liability in 
tort law reaffirm its significance. The courts in the Cape and 
Hudbay cases81 found or contemplated a parent company’s duty of 
care leading to its liability for a subsidiary’s damaging 
operations. However, in both cases the courts write explicitly and 
at length that this is not a challenge to the legal separation 
principle. Far from being a vindication of “enterprise liability” 
reasoning, the judgements put forward a liability for the parent’s 
own faulty conduct. The policy considerations raised by holding 
the parent liable were explicitly recognized by the Hudbay 
court.82 Therefore such judicial developments remain confined to 
direct involvement situations and have no bearing on indirect 
involvement situations.  
The 2011 OECD Guidelines offer another reminder of the 
continuing significance of the legal separation principle in BHR. 
The OECD updated the Guidelines to bring them in line with the 
UNGPs, but significantly added a new sentence regarding the 
parent company’s responsibilities: ‘This is not intended to shift 
responsibility from the entity causing an adverse impact to the 
enterprise with which it has a business relationship.”83 Clearly, 
the third legalization baseline has to account for the continued 
significance of the legal separation principle and the strong policy 
considerations it embodies.  
The legalization baseline can avoid dealing with this 
principle only if it drastically reduces its ambitions to cover the 
entire BHR field. Thus, the baseline could confine itself to direct 
involvement situations (causality and legal complicity) without 
generating frictions, as the Cape and Hudbay cases demonstrate. 
Or it might confine itself to the most severe abuses of human 
                                                                                                     
sequencing reflects a first order principle of human rights that the rightholders 
should be supported through all sources of leverage possible. U.N., GUIDING 
PRINCIPLES ON BUSINESS AND HUMAN RIGHTS 21–22 (2011). 
 80.  Comm’n on Human Rights, supra note 14, at ¶¶ 18–22. 
 81. See Skinner, supra note 1, at 1834–40 (analyzing these cases). 
 82.  The court indicated that there were “clearly competing policy 
considerations in recognizing a duty of care” between a Canadian mining 
company and individuals harmed by security personnel at its foreign operations. 
Choc v. Hudbay Minerals Inc., 2013 ONSC 1414, para. 75(Can. Ont. Sup. Ct. J.). 
For further discussion of this case, see generally Mares, supra note 12. 
 83. OECD, supra note 72, at 20.  
146 73 WASH. & LEE L. REV. ONLINE 117 (2016) 
rights in the manner Skinner proposed, an exception from the 
principle, justifiable on public policy grounds for gross abuses in 
high risk countries. But if the legalization baseline aims for 
comprehensiveness and coverall human rights and direct and 
indirect involvement situations, it cannot proceed uniformly 
coercively: for indirect involvement situations, obscuring the 
policy considerations behind the legal separation principle raises 
the specter of redirection of value chains which in turn triggers 
the two other first-order principles and thus together doom a 
hard legalization proposal.  
The analysis so far drew attention to several aspects of 
context that the third legalization perspective needs to remain 
mindful of: first, some structural changes in the global economy 
that defy the simplicity of older views on MNEs as hierarchical 
organizations headquartered-in-the-West; second, a range of 
openings in several policy channels with a bearing on BHR; and 
third, the specificity of the transnational BHR setting among the 
broader debates around corporate accountability. These three 
reflections on the context of legalization in BHR further draw on 
the previous sections that analyzed the evolution of thinking in 
BHR from the first legalization baseline to the second one drawn 
by the Ruggie mandate. The third legalization baseline should be 
mindful of these four aspects in order to remain attuned to the 
context of BHR in 2016.  
The third legalization baseline should not succumb to the 
same reductionisms displayed by the first legalization baseline: 
an over-emphasis on coerciveness, parent companies, and 
unidimensional narrative on the global economy. Instead, the 
third legalization baseline should reflect a more complex 
regulatory understanding of legalizing the BHR field. Such 
understanding has to avoid repeating the reductionisms of the 
first baseline and find ways to expand beyond the MNE (abandon 
the moving liability upwards project), beyond the coercive (not 
discard softer legalization and non-legal strategies of change), 
and beyond a unidimensional view of the global economy (avoid a 
narrative that uniformly pitches MNEs and markets, augmented 
by trade and investment policies, against human rights). Instead, 
as proposed below, the third baseline should fundamentally 
manage to valorize softer legalization and other strategies, 
encompass multiple transnational channels to maximizing 
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leverage for human rights, and offer a multi-dimensional 
narrative capable of taking advantage of openings in the global 
economy. The result would be a baseline that is better attuned to 
the transnational BHR context, that avoids relapsing in the 
weaknesses of the first baseline, and that reinforces the strengths 
of the second baseline. 
B. A BHR Legalization Perspective to Match the Context 
The third legalization baseline could be facilitated by 
adopting a “two track, multichannel perspective on BHR 
legalization” that I have outlined elsewhere.84 In a nutshell, this 
is an analytical effort that begins by separating two contexts of 
BHR depending on the direct or indirect involvement of a 
company in its business partners’ harmful operations. It 
continues by explaining and justifying the use of different 
legalization strategies, ranging from the hard and coercive to the 
softer and more complex policy mixes. The task then becomes 
about accounting for other transnational channels co-evolving 
together with the intra-firm channel of MNEs in a narrative of 
globalization that enables rather than discourages such inquiries 
and institutional innovations. The next subpart will then caution 
and re-emphasize that the third legalization baseline cannot be 
reduced to “just legalize the HRDD” from the UNGPs and the 
perils such reasoning entails. 
1. Regarding the two different settings in BHR—direct and 
indirect involvement of parent companies—the previous subpart 
explained how each setting affects the availability of harder or 
softer legalization strategies. Indeed, indirect involvement cases 
have difficulties to accommodate hard legalization (either 
outright bans or holding the parent company liable for harm) 
because of frictions with three first order principles under the 
specter that value chains will be redirected. Softer legalization 
and other non-legal strategies of change are essential then to 
reduce such frictions. 
The HRDD contained in the UNGPs could be legalized in a 
more or less coercive manner depending on how the regulatory 
                                                                                                     
 84. See generally, e.g., Mares, supra note 12; Mares, supra note 33. 
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regime is structured in terms of standards of due diligence, 
defenses, and sanctions for non-compliance.85 To avoid and reduce 
the risk of redirection, and set a “reasonable” burden on the 
parent company, a less coercive and less demanding HRDD legal 
regime could be proposed. Furthermore, transparency laws 
requiring companies to state how they identify and manage their 
impacts on human rights would represent a softer legalization 
strategy.86 Also, other contractual measures and a multitude of 
incentives could be designed to encourage companies to 
undertake HRDD. The legalization perspective would still have to 
figure out how such softer legalization could count in the big 
picture of securing human rights. What would be the true value 
of such softer legalization in safeguarding the human rights of 
those endangered or harmed by affiliates’ operations?  
In essence, such softer legalization of HRDD will be an 
obligation to act rather than remain passive and it will activate 
some leverage from the parent company, but probably it will still 
harvest insufficient leverage to ensure that human rights are 
genuinely secured in business partners’ operations. One will 
naturally hesitate between the temptation to dismiss such softer 
legalization of HRDD as inadequate and the difficulty to imagine 
how a legalistic perspective could valorize the limited leverage 
created by HRDD. 
The two-track perspective herein holds that the value of 
softer legalization should be regarded differently: for direct 
involvement cases, softer legalization could well be seen as a 
stepping stone towards the ideal of coercive, hard legalization 
                                                                                                     
 85. See generally Mares, supra note 12 (analyzing the Parliamentary 
debates in France around the legislative proposal on the “duty of vigilance”). 
 86. An EU transparency directive advances “a flexible and non-intrusive 
approach” of a “comply or explain” nature:  
Companies may use existing national or international reporting 
frameworks and will retain their margin of manoeuvre to define the 
content of their policies, and flexibility to disclose information in a 
useful and relevant way. When companies consider that some policy 
areas are not relevant for them, they will be allowed to explain why 
this is the case, rather than being forced to produce a policy. 
EUROPEAN COMM’N, PROPOSAL FOR A DIRECTIVE OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT 
AND OF THE COUNCIL AMENDING COUNCIL DIRECTIVES 78/660/EEC AND 
83/349/EEC AS REGARDS DISCLOSURE OF NON-FINANCIAL AND DIVERSITY 
INFORMATION BY LARGE COMPANIES AND GROUPS 2 (Apr. 16, 2013). 
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measures, and/or as lack of political will from states to hold 
companies accountable; for indirect involvement cases, softer 
legalization has an indispensable role in mobilizing leverage of 
MNEs and in managing frictions with “first order principles” 
characteristic to transnational BHR. The next step then is to 
explain how softer legalization would make a difference in 
indirect involvement situations. The multichannel perspective 
herein offers a way to begin valorizing softer legalization: such 
legalization of MNE responsibilities should not be regarded in 
isolation, but in relation to other transnational channels that are 
carrying their own leverage for human rights. 
2. Regarding the multichannel perspective, the recent 
developments in different policy fields show the activation of 
multiple policy channels. The transnational channels mentioned 
previously87 increasingly incorporate human rights standards. At 
the same time, such provisions are not hard legalization given 
that they do not create new coercive arrangements or stringent 
remedies for victims. The picture that might well emerge is that 
softer legalization of MNE responsibilities is merely joined by 
further soft legalization in other transnational channels. So even 
with the expended field of vision that the multi-channel 
perspective delivers, even by keeping abreast of latest 
developments in multiple channels, an unsatisfactory picture of 
generalized soft legalization prevails. However, this multichannel 
perspective goes further: it draws attention to the myriads of 
cross references and joint programs indicating that channels 
increasingly align and interact, and direct their combined 
leverage towards root causes of human rights infringements.  
Given that policy channels have potential to align and 
interact, or actually already exhibit these features, a “roping 
metaphor” can be used to impress gaining strength out of weaker 
threads.88 The challenge for the third legalization baseline is to 
capitalize on these openings in the global economy and devise a 
                                                                                                     
 87.  See generally supra Part IV.A; Mares, supra note 33 (providing 
examples from the five policy channels). 
 88. See Mares, supra note 33, at 196 (explaining the “roping” strategy: “a 
regulatory regime coming to terms with the multiple, though limited, tools in its 
arsenal and therefore seeking to gather strength by bundling together weak 
strands (soft legal institutionalization options) into a “rope” that targets root 
causes of problems rather than their symptoms”). 
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regulatory perspective on BHR that encompasses inter-state 
channels and intra-MNE channels and knits a protective network 
for rightholders. 
Such “rope” thinking explains the “policy mixes” rhetoric in 
CSR and takes seriously the “policy coherence” ambitions that 
the European Union (EU), for example, has been espousing more 
and more in the last 10 years. The EU Trade Commissioner is 
currently having this type of discourse89 and builds on the 2015 
Trade for All strategy paper. Also, the EU CSR strategy papers 
that commenced in 2001 can be taken as a case study of 
legalization in CSR; in 2011, the EU lost the “voluntary basis” 
definition of CSR and moved to towards “policy mixes,” which in 
turn made much more meaningful and credible the multichannel 
and policy coherence aspects that were already present in the 
2006 CSR white paper.  
Regarding softer legalization and non-legal developments, 
there is a jungle of new developments happening in multiple 
transnational channels that needs to be accounted for and made 
sense of. The argument herein is that softer legalization can be 
strengthened through a roping strategy that seeks the alignment 
and interaction of channels. In examining these new regulatory 
dynamics, the legalization perspective should pay attention to 
whether these channels address root causes or not, and whether 
there is potential or even actual alignment and interaction among 
channels.90 It is important to resist reductionism in several 
guises: assess each channel in isolation from the others, brand 
‘soft legalization’ on them, and therefore summarily dismiss them 
as inadequate for securing human rights. Instead, the interest 
should be in roping the transnational channels and thus 
valorizing better soft legalization given the specific of the context 
(transnational BHR context marked by the three first order 
principles). 
3. Regarding the multi-dimensional narrative, the third 
legalization baseline should employ a narrative capable to 
facilitate taking account and advantage of openings in the global 
                                                                                                     
 89. See Cecilia Malmström, Responsible Supply Chains: What's the EU 
Doing?, EUR. COMM’N (Dec. 7, 2015). 
 90. See generally Mares, supra note 33 (providing an in-depth explanation 
of these arguments). 
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economy. The openness, interdependencies, and ubiquity of 
economic exchanges make it slightly harder for public and private 
decision-makers to avoid scrutiny and responsibility for their 
decisions’ impacts on human rights. Recent policy developments 
indicate fresh opportunities to harvest leverage for human rights. 
Also, the Ruggie mandate employed such a multi-dimensional 
narrative and thus cleared the way to develop a new legalization 
perspective on BHR.  
If the ambition is for a more comprehensive legalization 
perspective extending beyond the most direct forms of 
involvement in abuse or beyond worst abuses, the challenge is to 
come with an understanding not only on how to uniformly curtail 
corporate power through hard legalization, but how to leverage 
MNE power in the current transnational context through 
legalization. The narrative on legalizing BHR should encourage 
an updated and broad field of vision. 
This Article explains soft legalization not as a symptom of a 
persistent lack of political will to get tough against MNEs, 
although that clearly can be a factor, but as a way of reducing 
frictions with first order principles revolving around the 
redirection of supply chains. This, however, raises questions. Yes, 
soft legalization creates less friction and can contribute 
something that is better than nothing, but this in itself will not 
be enough for victims deprived of access to justice and for 
companies determined to maximize profits at the expense of 
human rights. The answer is to account for soft legalization of 
parent companies’ responsibility, not in isolation but in 
conjunction with other weak threads that could be bundled in a 
rope to gain strength.  Yes, one might retort, however this 
alignment of channels is not only recent, but also patchy: it is far 
from a majority of home and host states that purposefully seek to 
promote human rights through a multitude of channels, 
especially economic channels promoting trade agreements with 
human rights safeguards. Furthermore, some developing 
countries appear to pursue rapid development and seek 
integration in global markets with minimum sensitivities to 
human rights. The answer is to admit getting closer to what 
might be a major and fundamental divergence of development 
models based on national sovereignty. That, however, is no 
reason to discard out of hand recent developments in several 
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policy channels, but on the contrary to seek with even more 
determination new sources of leverage and new ways of 
combining them to protect human rights transnationally.  
Avoiding the reductionisms of the first baseline is a good 
start towards designing a multi-dimensional narrative on which 
the third legalization baseline could build. The second baseline 
that Ruggie drew reset the state and offered this much needed 
multi-dimensional narrative. The task now is to resist the 
temptation to revert to the first legalization baseline; therefore, 
this article concludes with some cautionary remarks.  
C. Towards Genuine Complementarity with the UNGPs 
In light of the three first order principles and the specter of 
MNEs complying by redirecting value chains, using coercion in a 
hard legalization strategy to make human rights due diligence 
(HRDD) mandatory is not as straightforward a task as might 
appear. This problematizes the search and rhetoric for a 
uniformly coercive regime of holding MNEs accountable for their 
direct and indirect involvement in abuses. The legalization task is 
far more complicated in indirect involvement situations. The first 
legalization baseline was involved in a project of reapplying to 
MNEs the expansive “respect-protect-fulfill” obligations of states 
under IHRL, and depicting all kinds of involvement in abuse as 
“complicity,” and thus fundamentally in moving liability upwards 
to the parent company. The third baseline will have to avoid 
repeating this project and will have to look beyond the MNE to 
other transnational channels for indirect involvement situations. 
The third legalization baseline should not be blinded by the 
pursuit of coercive strategies to hold companies accountable. The 
specificity of the transnational BHR setting requires a different 
treatment from the domestic corporate accountability setting. The 
baseline should look beyond the coercive forms of legalization. 
The third legalization baseline should find ways to valorize softer 
legalization and non-legal strategies of change and deliver more 
advanced versions of legal pluralism attuned to the transnational 
BHR setting. Soft law and non-legal drivers for change are 
indispensable in the transnational BHR context and genuinely 
valuable if “roped,” as this can deliver systemic transformation. 
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The first legalization baseline did not quite succeed to move 
beyond a rather raw legal pluralism despite attempts to account 
for soft and hard law, as well as self-regulation and other forms of 
private governance. As the project was to delocalize and move 
liability upwards towards the parent company, inherently it 
would be only coercive regulations that could match and reverse 
the profit motive and market competition. 
The third legalization baseline will have to come to terms 
with harder and softer legalization strategies and their relative 
position and justification in the BHR regime. Harder legalization 
will be confined to certain settings: where there is direct 
involvement of the parent company (causation and legal 
complicity) or involvement is indirect but a trading ban or a strict 
liability regime are justified (dealing with abusive parties 
involved in worst abuses, such as forced labor).91 This confined 
scope for harder legalization is not simply due to home states’ 
legislatures lacking political will to regulate “their” MNEs or 
lawmakers giving in to powerful MNEs, but mainly because of 
frictions with three “first order principles.” Discussing corporate 
accountability in the transnational BHR context has to keep 
distinct direct and indirect involvement situations separate 
because the legalization options will be different. A narrative 
about a uniformly coercive legal regime to hold MNEs 
accountable obscures the fault line between direct and indirect 
involvement. It would move one closer to repeating the error of 
the first legalization baseline and disregard the fundamental 
distinction contained in the UNGPs Principle 13. For keeping the 
two BHR regimes separated, Skinner’s treatment is salutary in 
the way it explains and carefully delimits the area where a 
plaintiff-friendly, coercive legal regime is warranted. This 
coercive strategy, however, evolves in the realm of exception and 
will not be able to assist in efforts of legalization for the rest of 
BHR field (less direct involvement of parent companies and less 
severe infringements of human rights).  
The “two track” perspective advanced herein suggests that 
one should not move liberally between the two regimes of BHR—
direct and indirect involvement—by using the banner of “just 
                                                                                                     
 91. See, e.g., 19 U.S.C. § 1907 (2012) (prohibiting the import and sale of 
goods manufactured by forced labor). 
154 73 WASH. & LEE L. REV. ONLINE 117 (2016) 
legalize the HRDD” contained in the UNGPs and thus selling the 
illusion that this legalization can be done as coercively as one 
wishes for. Indeed, regulating MNEs could be imagined as being 
merely a battle with the legal separation of entities principle 
alone; the temptation would be to overrun this principle under 
the normative power of human rights and “just hold MNEs 
accountable.” However, as argued herein, in the transnational 
human rights context, the battle is with three first order 
principles that also interact if the value chains would redirect in 
response to hard, coercive legalization of HRDD. Undertones of a 
unified, coercive strategy of holding MNEs accountable92 would 
merely sell an illusion that by advocacy a stringent approach can 
be expanded further and further to cover indirect involvement 
situations. Instead, such undertones will backfire by giving 
ammunition to opponents of corporate responsibilities and 
legalization to box-in the human rights perspective as fringe, 
ideological, and not mindful enough of first principles of corporate 
and state organization. The first legalization baseline was well 
underway in merging direct and indirect involvement situations 
and subjecting them to coercive regulations. Overall, the 
aforementioned undertones generated a unidimensional 
narrative of the global economy that played its part in sinking the 
Norms and that has now been overtaken by the multi-
dimensional narrative created by the Ruggie mandate. 
Broad calls on dealing decisively with MNEs run the risk of 
obscuring the diversity of involvement (direct or indirect), the 
diversity of legal sanctioning regimes (ranging from more to less 
coercive), and the multitude of parallel channels that should be 
accounted for in treating root causes of tainted value chains. In 
other words, the sanctioning legal regime should be far from an 
afterthought raising mere legal technicalities (DD defense, 
reversal of burden of proof, level of sanctions) but should be a 
                                                                                                     
 92. That the gravitational pull is towards the harder end of the continuum 
(strict liability) results from the natural plaintiff-friendly character of human 
rights proposals with recent writings advocating an insurance approach. See 
generally Skinner, McCorquodale, & De Schutter, supra note 11, at 96 
(recommending that “advocates encourage policy makers to investigate the 
enactment of such legislation (at the federal or state level) that requires or 
encourages businesses to obtain insurance that clearly cover claims against the 
business brought by citizens abroad who have been damaged by corporate 
actions”).  
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foundational aspect at the very core of how legalization works in 
transnational BHR. Saying that HRDD should be legalized to 
escape voluntarism says absolutely nothing about the dangers of 
redirection of value chains, about what “first order principles” are 
at play in the transnational BHR context, and about the genuine 
need for a carefully balanced policy mix needed to prevent 
redirection and find creative ways to summon maximum leverage 
for human rights protection. Far from a legal technicality to be 
sorted out later and subjected to political negotiations, these are 
aspects at the very heart of the role of legalization in global value 
chains. Indeed, too heavy a responsibility to act and/or sanction 
(liable for reparation of harm, for example) risks extinguishing 
the leverage. The company can redirect its value chain, as the 
risks are not worth taking. The legalization agenda then has to 
navigate a course around first order principles of international 
law, business law, and human rights law that interact in the 
transnational value chain context. 
Moving towards a comprehensive legalization baseline 
requires us to get clear about the limits of hard legalization when 
applied to MNEs (get rid of an illusion) and then to get down to a 
very laborious task of creating a less centralized regulatory 
regime with multiple moving parts (rope weaker threads into a 
strong rope). Once the multiple reductionisms performed by the 
first legalization baseline are put to rest—a narrowing down of 
BHR to the MNE (intra-firm channel) and to the coercive—a 
multitude of policy channels developing soft legalization and non-
legal strategies of change become visible. As the project is not 
merely about moving liability upwards to “hold MNEs 
accountable,” the task becomes one of mobilizing leverage from 
multiple sources and devising a “roping” strategy to further 
compound the leverage.  
Many corporate accountability proponents are inclined to see 
soft legalization as inherently inadequate or mere stepping stones 
towards the coercive law ideal. The result is thus not only a 
devaluation of such non-coercive drivers, but also a disincentive 
to account for recent developments in less obvious places such as 
trade and CSR; they deliver only more soft legalization and 
voluntarism. For example, labor provisions in FTAs are seen as 
much weaker than investor protections backed by international 
arbitration. Indeed, investment and trade regimes continue to be 
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seen as pro-business and even inherently unfriendly to human 
rights, and recent developments therein might well be summarily 
dismissed. The multichannel perspective on BHR impresses the 
need for an updated and broader field of vision to grasp new 
openings in the global economy and not dismiss them 
prematurely. Only then can a roping strategy become visible and 
viable to deliver systemic change in the transnational BHR 
setting. 
The correction to BHR that Ruggie applied in his work—his 
trademark of polycentrism promoting a narrower corporate 
responsibility wrapped in a more compelling narrative of human 
rights in the global economy—was a salutary development. The 
third legalization baseline should resist reverting uncritically to 
the first baseline of legalization drawn in the mid-2000s that has 
been overtaken both conceptually and by the realities of the 
global economy. Instead, the challenge is to build on the 
strengths of the second baseline and complement it with a 
carefully applied legalization layer. However, the 
complementarity between the UNGPs and further legalization 
between the second and third baselines in BHR has be genuine; 
this article sought to dispel the superficial complementarity 
inherent in broad calls to “just legalize HRDD,” for a treaty to 
just turn the UNGPs into law. Proponents of legalization have a 
choice: seek hard, coercive legalization in limited contexts where 
it is appropriate and creates minimum frictions with first order 
principles, or—if one is inclined to leave the comfort of coercive 
legal solutions and hierarchical ordering—seek a more complex 
legalization perspective of maximizing leverage for human rights 
in a way that builds on Ruggie’s polycentrism. It is necessary and 
possible that the early 2000s are not the last say in what a 
human rights law perspective has to offer as a comprehensive 
frame of thinking about corporate responsibilities in times of 
accelerating economic exchanges.  
V. Conclusion 
This rejoinder to Professor Skinner’s significant contribution 
to the BHR field explained its merits in two ways: on the one 
hand, by noting the careful delimitations of her argument that is 
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grounded in extensive research and sensible analysis, and on the 
other hand, by placing her proposal in the broader BHR context, 
where a debate on how to legalize MNE responsibilities has been 
on-going for decades.  
The bulk of the reflections in this rejoinder relate to this 
broader context of BHR. I accounted for three baselines that 
marked the thinking in this field: the first legalization baseline 
drawn by international human rights lawyers engaged in the UN 
Draft Norms effort of early 2000s, the second baseline exposing 
the polycentrism and principled pragmatism of the Ruggie 
mandate that delivered the 2011 UN Guiding Principles, and the 
third legalization baseline that is currently being drawn in the 
post-UNGPs period by those engaged in the 2014 UN process to 
craft a BHR treaty.  
Seeking to absorb the lessons from the two previous 
baselines, the argument herein was in favor of a legalization 
perspective on BHR that is both comprehensive and nuanced. I 
put forward a “two track, multichannel legalization perspective” 
as an effort to clarify a few aspects: (a) when coercive, harder 
legalization or softer forms of legalization are appropriate by 
analytically separating two regimes of BHR in line with the 
UNGPs Principle 13; (b) why there is a necessity to valorize 
better softer legalization and non-legal strategies by highlighting 
three “first order principles” that exist and interact in the 
transnational value chain context; and (c) how to valorize such 
softer legalization strategies by employing a “roping” strategy of 
gaining strength from weak threads and by accounting for recent 
developments in several channels that potentially or even 
actually are aligning and interacting to promote human rights.  
The third legalization baseline would benefit from reflecting 
deeply about the reductionisms displayed in the first legalization 
baseline as well as the current and specific context of 
transnational BHR. The article highlighted reductionism in 
several guises that came to define the first BHR baseline and 
proposed that the third baseline finds ways to expand beyond the 
MNE (abandon the project of moving liability upwards to the 
parent company), beyond the coercive (not diminish softer 
legalization and non-legal strategies of change), and beyond a 
unidimensional view of the global economy (avoid a narrative 
that uniformly pitches MNEs, markets, trade, and investment 
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policies, against human rights). Instead, the third baseline should 
fundamentally manage to valorize softer legalization and other 
strategies, encompass multiple transnational channels to 
maximizing leverage for human rights, and offer a multi-
dimensional narrative capable of taking advantage of openings in 
the global economy.  
The third legalization baseline should seek to be attuned to 
the context of BHR in 2016. Here, the article highlighted four 
dimensions redefining the context of BHR: structural changes in 
the global economy, openings in several policy channels with a 
bearing on BHR, the specificity of the transnational BHR setting 
characterized by three first order principles, and the Ruggie 
mandate that reset the BHR field crippled by the reductionisms 
of the first baseline.  
 The third legalization baseline should reflect a more complex 
regulatory understanding of legalization that is better attuned to 
the transnational BHR context. It should resist tendencies to 
conflate the two BHR regimes of direct and indirect involvement 
in abuse, refrain from putting forward coercive, hard legalization 
solutions as uniformly appropriate and feasible for the entire 
BHR field, and steer clear from old reductionist tendencies in 
order to identify new sources of leverage and find new ways to 
compound leverage. In essence, this rejoinder encourages 
reflection on the legalization of BHR in tune with mid-2010s 
realities by resisting an uncritical reversion to the thinking 
exposed in the first baseline and by seeking to add a legalization 
layer on the second baseline in a way that ensures genuine 
complementarity between the UNGPs and the further 
legalization project. 
